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Abstract
The World Health Organization has once declared antiretroviral therapy a state of 
global emergency. It has initiated a difficult process of change of international policies 
on export of patent-protected pharmaceutical products to developing countries. Since 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted the “Declaration on the TRIPS Agree-
ment and Public Health” at its 4th Ministerial Conference in Doha, the public health 
activists seemed to believe that once it will be implemented, there is hope for third 
world countries which combat HIV/AIDS epidemic. It was not a long time after when it 
turned out that such a complex problem consisting of polar opposite interests cannot 
be handled in the traditional manner of adopting universal provisions of international 
law. The article focuses on the circumstances which have been a starting point for 
one of the most controversial policies undertaken by the WTO countries. It shows the 
consequences of putting into practice the reform of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. The aim of the article is to summarize experi-
ence of past two decades of tackling the problem and to assess the approach that has 
been undertaken by the involved countries. 
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Introduction
The state’s representatives deliberating at the beginning of the new millennium, 
sometime around year 2000, during the conferences reflecting on relaxing patent 
protection on drugs were about to put into practice the ultimate saying “the end 
justifies the means”. They had a strong motivating factor because at the same time, 
developing countries, especially in Africa, were framing their patent policies and 
strongly lobbying in the European Union and the United States trying to negotiate 
their interests with major pharmaceutical companies. The key negotiators acting 
on behalf of the African NGOs were using all means, fair or foul, iron or poison, for 
achieving their ends. And they did succeed. The Fourth Ministerial Conference, 
and strictly speaking the Article 1 of the Doha Declaration seemed to be the turn-
ing point in the relaxation of pharmaceutical patents, balancing well the interests 
of consumers and of the patent holders.
In spite of that, experiences during the last 15 years have taught us that the 
Doha Conference did not provide a miraculous panaceum for the patenting of 
AIDS drugs and its rational distribution in the third world countries. Adopted ap-
proach for policy-makers and health system managers did not result in the better 
drugs distribution or better quality of care.1 I would advocate a thesis we can 
assess the Doha Declaration’s legacy as a backward step.
Significant health problem
To provide an overview of the subject under consideration it is appropriate to 
refer the circumstances of the debate launched by the World Trade Organization 
on the access to the HIV/AIDS medication in the countries which do not have 
capacity to manufacture the required drugs. 
To begin with the African public health problems it has to be outlined that in 
East Africa the daily number of deaths from AIDS has exceeded 300. Reports say 
that for instance in Kenya there are 1.2–1.5 million people living with HIV/AIDS. 
More than 50% population of that country live on 1 USD per day. It reveals the 
weakness of public health system in such poor countries. Kenya, what is rather 
exotic in that part of the world, has adopted legislation on intellectual property. 
What is more, the first Kenyan Industrial Property Act was from 1990, which could 
imply a strong legal background for a research and development sector. And yet, 
nothing could be more wrong. However, as Ben Sihanya, a dedicated and inquis-
itive researcher of the legal obstacles in access to the pharmaceuticals in Africa 
1  D. Ross-Degnan, R. Laing, B. Santoso et al., Improving pharmaceutical use in primary 
care in developing countries: a critical review of experience and lack of experience, Presented 
at the International Conference on Improving the Use of Medicines, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 
April 1997.
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alleges, the said Act was promulgated in 1989 partly to protect Kenyan scientists 
and the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI)2 over the claim that they had 
invented a drug for AIDS, Kemron.3 Even several decades ago, the development of 
a new drug was a long-term and very expensive process. What is more, the extent 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights varied widely around the world 
so the Kenya’s Industrial Property Act was pioneering the concept of acquiring 
benefits from patent protection. The fact that patents have appeared to be a main 
obstacle to getting antiretroviral drugs, was caused by the failure of the internal 
research programme and an inefficient politics which had led to lack of funds 
to pay royalties. Following calls by experts throughout the 1990s, the Industrial 
Property Act has finally been amended by the Kenyan government to allow for the 
parallel importation of generics from India, Brazil and other countries.4
Obstacles against providing access to medicines
Until 1995, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established, extent 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights varied widely around the world. 
Approaches that have been adopted by the contracting states consisted of ground 
rules for trade and IP protection. The initial standpoint was that trade would 
be flowing freely around the world with the guarantee of analogous protection 
of intellectual property rights worldwide.5 One of the founding documents of 
the WTO was the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS),6 which attempted to bring the protection of intellectual property 
rights under common international rules.
Nearly five years, while the TRIPS provisions were in action, had shown that 
the third world countries dealing with serious public health problem were de-
preciated versus the countries of IP rights holders. The problem was aggravated 
2  The Kenya Medical Research Institute is a State Corporation established through the 
Science and Technology (Amendment) Act of 1979, which has since been amended to Sci-
ence, Technology and Innovation Act 2013. The 1979 Act established KEMRI as a national 
body responsible for carrying out health research in Kenya; [online] http://www.kemri.
org/index.php/about-kemri/background [access: 20.04.2016].
3  B. Sihanya, TRIPS and Access to Drugs, Food and the Relevant Technologies in Kenya: 
Reforming Intellectual Property and Trade Laws for Sustainable Development, Research re-
port for EcoNews Africa (Nairobi) preparations for the Cancún WTO meeting, 2003.
4  K. C. Shadlen, The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The Industrial Bases 
of Health Policies, Intellectual Property, Pharmaceuticals and Public Health. Access to Drugs 
in Developing Countries, p 280.
5  C. M. Correa, Intellectual property rights, the WTO and developing countries: the TRIPS 
agreement and policy options, Washington 2000, pp. 3–4.
6  The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, [online] https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm [access: 2.04.2016].
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by two significant factors. Firstly, it has to be stressed that the antiretroviral med-
ication could not be imported due to the lasting patent protection in the wealthy 
countries where the drugs have been manufactured. Secondly, it was question-
able if the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
permitted production for export to the third world countries.
TRIPS Article 31 recognized the right of member states to grant compulsory 
licenses, but there were several conditions to meet before. Initially, compulsory 
licensing was limited by requiring a period of negotiation between the member 
state and the patent holder unless, as noted in subparagraph (b), it is a “case of 
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”. That mecha-
nism was expected to accelerate the trade by obtaining voluntary licenses, price 
reduction or voluntary donation of a IP – protected good. Subparagraph (f) of 
Article 31 further limited compulsory licensing saying that use of the compulso-
ry license must be made predominantly for the supply of the domestic market.7 
That provision had been actually eliminating the possibility of countries with 
low manufacturing capacity claiming a compulsory license for drugs imported 
from another member state. 
Article 31 became a subject of a public controversy. The developing and de-
veloped countries took opposite stands on the issue of patentability of HIV/AIDS 
drugs and their export to, so-called, least-developed countries.8 At height of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in East Africa, World Trade Organization members, especial-
ly the forty -one members of the African Group, agreed on the clarification of 
the problem of international support for poor countries dealing with the serious 
public health problems accompanied with the economy downturn. The TRIPS 
Agreement’s flexibilities in connection with health were added to the agenda of 
the WTO’s 4th Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001.
The restriction of Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement, was the main rec-
ognized problem.9 Developing country activists claimed that African countries 
are simply too poor to run specialized pharmaceutical factories and they lack 
necessary experience and the domestic market is too small to attract suffi-
cient investment in the pharmaceutical sector. For instance, Kenya argued for 
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement to be either deleted or amended; it also 
argued for subsequent interpretations to ensure sufficiency in manufacturing 
capacity for Kenya to make use of compulsory licensing.10 Article 1 of the Doha 
7  R. M. Hilty, Kung-Chung Liu, Compulsory Licensing: Practical Experiences and Ways 
Forward, Washington 2015, p. 194. 
8  R. J. Gilbert, W. K. Tom, “Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The Intellectual 
Property Guidelines Five Years Later”, Antitrust Law Journal 2001, Vol. 69, p. 45.
9  A. Eikermann, “The Conditions of Art. 31 lits a-l”, [w:] WTO – Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, eds. P. T. Stoll, J. Busche, K. Arend, Leiden 2009, p. 574.
10  B. Sihanya, Patents, Parallel Importation and Compulsory Licensing of HIV/AIDS Drugs: 
The Experience of Kenya, Managing the Challenges of Wto Participation: Case Study 19, 
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Declaration11 recognized the gravity of health problems afflicting developing 
countries, including AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. Paragraph 5 reaffirmed 
the infamous Article 31, recognizing the authority of member states to grant 
compulsory licenses, to determine the grounds for compulsory licenses to “de-
termine what constitutes a national emergency”, and to define its own licens-
ing regime without challenge.12 Commentators claim that while paragraph 5 
did not constitute a policy change, it potentially offered a strong signal of the 
acceptability of compulsory licensing of medicines. Article 6 empowered the 
Council to find a “solution” for members with “insufficient or no manufactur-
ing capabilities” to supply their domestic market by the end of 2002.13
There have been fundamental misunderstandings. Consequently, many par-
ticipants of the negotiations during the Ministerial Conference in Doha argued 
that African firms do not have the capacity to manufacture or distribute special-
ized drugs, its pharmaceutical economy sector is oligopolistic and processing 
under a compulsory licenses may lead to misconducts and corruption.
The way ahead for the developing countries
The first decision was adopted on 24th November 2002, but the African Group ar-
gued that it was “unsatisfactory and unworkable”. It considered this was “a step 
back from Doha because it created further restrictions on the current flexibilities 
in the TRIPS Agreement”.
Finally, on 30th August 2003, the TRIPS Council complied with the obligation 
imposed under the Doha Declaration and issued the decision with a waiver 
that allowed the states – producers of the medication under patent protection 
to issue a compulsory licenses for the export of pharmaceutical products to 
nations with insufficient pharmaceutical production capabilities. The decision 
finally defined the controversial concept of exporter/importer and left no room 
for doubts when assessing the criteria of licensed pharmaceutical drug. The ne-
gotiator decided that in terms of waived TRIPS pharmaceutical product means 
[online] https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case19_e.htm#top 
[access: 20.04.2016].
11  World Trade Organization (2001 November 20) Declaration on the TRIPS agreement 
and public health, [online] http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min-
decl_trips_e.htm [access: 20.04.2016].
12  C. M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options 
for Developing Countries, South Centre T.R.A.D.E., Working Papers No 5, Buenos Aires 1999, 
p. 321.
13  Adopted on 14 November 2001, the “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health” opened with the following words: “We recognize the gravity of the public health 
problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those result-
ing from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics”.
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any patented product, or product manufactured through a patented process, of 
the pharmaceutical sector needed to address the public health problems as rec-
ognized in paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration. It was understood that active 
ingredients necessary for its manufacture and diagnostic kits needed for its use 
would be included.
According to the Article 2 of the decision, the obligations of an exporting 
member14 state under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with 
respect to the grant by it of a compulsory license to the extent necessary for the 
purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eli- 
gible importing member(s)15 in accordance with the following terms: (a) the 
eligible importing member(s) has made a notification to the Council for TRIPS, 
that: (i) specifies the names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed; 
(ii) confirms that the eligible importing member in question, other than a least 
developed country member, has established that it has insufficient or no manu-
facturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question 
in one of the ways set out in the annex to the decision of 30 August 2003; and (iii) 
confirms that, where a pharmaceutical product is patented in its territory, it has 
granted or intends to grant a compulsory license in accordance with Article 31 
of the TRIPS Agreement and the provisions of the decision of 30 August 2003.
After the Ministerial Conference in Doha the compromise seemed to be sa-
tisfactory and lobbying efforts finally began to yield success. Major changes took 
place also in the internal legislatives. On 27th July 2001 the Kenyan Industrial Pro-
perty Act of 1989 was replaced by the amended Industrial Property Act. Kenya 
revised the Industrial Property Act because of the need of compliance with WTO/
TRIPS guidelines. The 2001 Act limited a patentee’s rights (The rights under the 
patent shall not extend to acts in respect of articles which have been put on the 
market in Kenya or in any other country or imported into Kenya by the owner of 
the patent or with his express consent). 
The most visible player in the campaign was a business representative Cos-
mos Industries, which effectively lobbied the government to allow compulsory 
14  „Exporting member” means a member using the system set out in the decision of 
30 August 2003 to produce pharmaceutical products for, and export them to, an eligible 
importing member.
15  „Eligible importing member” means any least-developed country member, and any 
other member that has made a notification to the Council for TRIPS of its intention to use 
the system as an importer, it being understood that a member may notify at any time that 
it will use the system in whole or in a limited way, for example only in the case of a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commer-
cial use. It is noted that some members will not use the system set out in the decision of 
30 August 2003 as importing members and that some other members have stated that, if 
they use the system, it would be in no more than situations of national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.
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licensing. This was also the first applicant for a license under the revised provi-
sions. It sought to be allowed to produce a drug, the product of Glaxo SmithKline 
and Boehringer Ingelheim of Germany.16 
Challenges under new regime
Public health advocates were afraid that despite the Doha Declaration and the 
waiver of Article 31(f) there is fear that compulsory licensing activity would have 
not be undertaken. The main obstacles were lack of the production capacity, dis-
tribution networks, and buying power. In fact, all of their doubts proved to be true.
And, as if all that weren’t enough, another identified problem referred to ge-
nerics and the fact that their influx may lead to an influx of counterfeit drugs. 
Nowadays, counterfeiting has become a problem to a degree that drastically 
needs to be addressed.
The main problem is with understanding of what is generic medicine and 
under what circumstances generic medicine can be manufactured or import-
ed in a country facing fundamental problem with access to medication. Even if 
countries are adopting anti-counterfeit acts and rules for identifying a fake phar-
maceutical product availed to the market or presented to it and intentionally 
tailored to derive and ride on the reputation or goodwill of another good through 
labelling or marking. In such community as East Africa to make people aware 
that the counterfeits are not necessarily substandard, but they are harmful be-
cause of causing an infringement of someone’s monopoly – is rather challenging. 
Pointedly, there is widespread ignorance in Africa on the meaning of intellectual 
property rights. Manufacturing companies are afraid to invest in compulsory 
licensing or parallel importation for fear generally of taking on the western phar-
maceutical concerns. IP law researchers outline that companies often do not 
actually realize that they have the legal backing to do so. 
The Doha Declaration was intended to be a strong political statement that 
could be an accelerator for developing countries to adopt effective measures 
necessary to ensure access to health care without the fear of being dragged into 
a legal battle. However, figures show that because of focusing on laws and politics 
public health problem became nothing less. The number of patients treated for 
HIV/AIDS increased more than twelve-fold between 2003 and 2010. In 2003, 
only 50,000 patients were on anti-retroviral medicines treatment. By 2005, this 
number had increased to 1.57 million patients in January 2005, a number that 
increased to 5.2 million patients by December 2009.17
16  Lastly, Glaxo SmithKline and Cosmos agreed on acceptable terms for a voluntary 
licence.
17  A. van Gelder, P. Stevens, The compulsory license red herring, London 2010.
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Governments procurement of HIV/AIDS medicines, which is not constrained 
by the WTO, the TRIPS Agreement is largely wasteful. There is particularly no 
support for research and development economy sector. Generally, the problem 
of permitted discrimination by sector of the economy seems to be an important 
unanswered question. The issue of life-and-death importance in many countries 
which combat epidemics is access to medication. Facing a state of emergency, 
politicians do not think about framework for adopting a strategy involving uni-
versities and cooperation of public and private sector. Policy tailors who promote 
long-term suppositions and claim that it is also important to invest in the pre-
vention – are rather underrepresented. East Africa is dealing with that kind of 
“emergency state” for many years. 
Conclusions
It has been nearly two decades since a legal tool of compulsory license was in-
stitutionalized in international framework policies. Today we can assess the out-
come of that experimental strategy, which has put into practice the standpoint of 
the negotiators of the 4th Ministerial Conference in Doha.
Unfortunately, that action seems to be a failure of global health governance. 
Objectively speaking, compulsory license has enabled the rich countries where 
the HIV/AIDS drugs are manufactured to see how specific legal instruments rel-
evant to international intellectual property law can be misinterpreted and used 
to the only benefit of local politicians or mafiosos, who have frequently acted in 
these both roles at a time. By trying to organize a cooperation, it was necessary 
for the western concerns and their representatives to root in the attitudes and 
values which have been far from the modern philosophy of free market.18 Finally, 
by using the said legal tool by the international pharmaceutical companies and 
developed countries they were enabled to capture the circumstances which are 
the significant obstacle to implement the western legal policies in the developing 
countries.
Overall speaking, experience of last 16 years has shown that the regime on 
compulsory licensing is in regress and fails to fulfill its function to balance private 
and public interests.19 The debate launched two decades ago has not resolved the 
problem of access to HIV/AIDS medication. Skeptics observe that most of the re-
sources on HIV/AIDS combat are spent on conferences, summits, and awareness 
campaigns. 
18  F. M. Abbott, “Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs: The TRIPS Agenda at 
the WTO after the Doha Declaration on Public Health”, Quaker United Nations Office, Occa-
sional Paper No 9, Geneva 2008, p. 26.
19  G. Chaves, M. Oliveira, A proposal for measuring the degree of public health-sensitivity 
of patent legislation in the context of the WTO TRIPS Agreement, Bull World Health Organ 
2007, pp. 49–56.
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It leads to the conclusion that problem of access to HIV/AIDS drugs in devel-
oping countries is more complex and does not only engage the patent holders, 
the World Trade Organization or activists in social movements and voluntary as-
sociations opposing to the patenting of HIV/AIDS drugs. What appear as crucial 
are political and socio-economic improvements of public health. Undertaking 
such reforms has to be with finding resources and empowering the significance 
of the sector of research and development.
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